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This thesis investigates how the unemployment rate affect the sickness-absence in Troms 
county. For doing so, we set up a model that investigates the causal relationship between 
labor market tightness and workers absence behavior and the cyclical selecting of employees 
with bad health during different states of the business cycle. We take advantage of over 
230,000 recorded sickness-absences and measures their transition from sickness back to 
work.  Since job-security laws differs in labor-market, we choose to focus on the respected 
government-, municipality- and private sectors. The results indicate significant differences 
between the sectors, especially between private and public sector.  Key findings are that: (1) 
The average health condition for public workers fluctuates more with the business cycle 
compared to private workers. (2) Lower economic activity during a spell sequence increases 
the risk of losing the job, however, this risk is significantly less shared in the public sector. 
(3) The propensity for claiming sick increases during lower economic activity. However, the 
“threshold” for claiming sick is significantly lower for municipality and government workers 
compared to private workers.  Conclusion; The high level of sickness-absence in Troms 
county can to some degreed be explained by the large share of public workplaces.  
 
 











Table of content 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 3 
Empirical Literature ................................................................................................................... 6 
The Data ..................................................................................................................................... 8 
Demographic Variables .......................................................................................................... 9 
Geographical Variable and Restriction .................................................................................. 9 
Labor-Market Variables ....................................................................................................... 10 
Method ..................................................................................................................................... 12 
The Choice of Statistical Method ......................................................................................... 12 
Surival Analysis ................................................................................................................... 12 
Parametric versus Non-Parametric ....................................................................................... 13 
The Weibull Model .............................................................................................................. 14 
Identification Strategy and Estimation ..................................................................................... 15 
Results ...................................................................................................................................... 18 
Concluding Remarks ................................................................................................................ 23 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................. 24 
References ................................................................................................................................ 25 
Appendix .................................................................................................................................. 26 
The most important r-studio codes ....................................................................................... 32 
 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1 Unemployment rate developments ......................................................................................................... 10 
Figure 2 Sickness-absence distribution ................................................................................................................. 26 
Figure 3 Log of survival times .............................................................................................................................. 26 
 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics ............................................................................................................................... 11 
Table 2  Characteristics of sectors ........................................................................................................................ 12 
Table 3 Log-likelihood and AIC results ............................................................................................................... 13 
Table 4 Regression Results ................................................................................................................................... 19 
Table 5 How sectors react to changes in the unemployment rate ......................................................................... 23 
Table 6 Working variable names .......................................................................................................................... 27 
Table 7 Regression of simple model..................................................................................................................... 28 
Table 8 Regression more realistic model .............................................................................................................. 29 
Table 9 Checking significance between sectors ................................................................................................... 30 








The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between the unemployment and 
sickness-absence in Troms county. More precisely, how the unemployment rate affect 
sickness-absence duration, with the focus on different sectors.  Previous findings in this field 
show that there tend to be a negative relationship between these two measurements, see Leigh 
(1985). These findings indicate that the unemployment rate creates a procyclical sickness-
absence. In simple terms, the presence of procyclical absenteeism implies when the economy 
is going well, and unemployment rate is low, workers exhibit longer and more frequent 
absence spells. The same principles apply vice versa. Why is this interesting? From an 
economic perspective, “the tide lifts all boats” is an argument widely used for economic 
growth. However, there seem to be negative consequences with respect to sickness absence 
that follows economic upturns.  
  The widespread of sickness absence in Norway is substantial. According to Det Kongelige 
Finansdepartementet (2017) the sick-pay scheme exceeded 41 billion NOK in 2017. Loss of 
efficiency, productivity and health care expenditures are costly for companies and 
governments. Among the monetary costs and financial expenditures stands the negative 
consequences for individuals. Goodman and Atkin (1984) summarizes the negative 
consequences for individuals as follows; lost payments, increased accidents, less disciplined 
actions (e.g. not performing work tasks) and changed job-perceptions. Hence, increased 
knowledge for governments, policymakers and companies may increase efficiency and 
human health with respect to sickness absence.      
  Industrial psychologists and business management researchers have been devoting 
considerable attention to absenteeism. Yet, it is only relatively recently that the topic has 
received the same amount of scholarly attention from economists. In so doing the inverse 
relationship between unemployment rates and sickness-absence was observed  (see e.g. 
(Leigh, 1985); (Audas & Goddard, 2001);(Askildsen, Bratberg, & Nilsen, 2005);(Arai & 
Thoursie, 2005)  Previous papers show that job-security and financial incentives, e.g. 
sickness-payment, have an impact on sickness-absence behavior. (see , (Buzzard & Shaw, 
1952); ((Røed & Zhang, 2003); (T. A. Barmby, Orme, & Treble, 1991);(Olsson, 2009)). But 
these two factors alone can’t explain the complexity of sickness-absence. 
The existing literature differentiate between two main channels that may contribute to 
procyclical absenteeism. The first is the selection effect. This concept assumes that the 
4 
 
available workforce has individuals that are differently exposed to sickness. Those who are 
more exposed to sickness are therefore more absent. When the business cycle is increasing, 
the economy needs more available workforce. That’s is, the selecting effect arises if 
employment behavior of people with bad health is especially cyclical. This demand for 
workforce pulls the more sickness-prone workers inside the labor-market and creates the 
procyclical pattern we observe.  Literature define them as marginal workers, see Arai and 
Thoursie (2005). Further, in economic downturns the more sickness-prone workers are the 
first to be selected out. E.g. the marginal worker, see Leigh (1985).  
   The second channel concerns the causal effects that influence worker’s absence behavior. 
The literature summarizes three sub-channels for how different labor-market tightness may 
causally affect the absence behavior of workers. Thereby create this procyclical pattern1.  
First, there is an incentive effect. When the macroeconomic conditions are good – that is, jobs 
are safe and new jobs are easily found – the potential cost of being caught shirking is low. 
Further, when the unemployment rate is dropping, workers become less fearful of losing their 
jobs and more inclined to be absent, e.g. lowering threshold for claiming sick. (see(Leigh, 
1985); (T. Barmby, Sessions, & Treble, 1994)).  
  Second, there is a stress effect. Tighter labor-market conditions impact the health of workers 
directly, see (Ruhm, 2003). A higher demand for product and services gives a more stressful 
workplace, resulting in more stress and accidents for workers.    
  And third is the monitoring effect. A decreased unemployment rate yields a less available 
workforce, and thus it is more difficult obtaining replacements for absent workers. In good 
times, firms increase monitoring and other health promoting activities for preventing 
absenteeism.  
The two main channels are not mutually exclusive explanations, but economic theory cannot 
tell which of the effects that prevails or dominates in a given region at a given point in time. 
This is an empirical question.  
  The argument for focusing on the different sectors bases on the high share of government 
and municipality workplaces in Troms and different job-security laws towards them. There 
exist two main laws that govern the Norwegian labor-market. E.g. “Statsansatteloven” and 
the Working Environment Act. Where the former yields stronger job-security for its 
employed in the government sector.  
                                                 
1  Absence assumptions in this field of economics bases from the first paper that investigates this relationship. 
Different papers describe the assumptions differently, while they have the same origin.  For more info, see the 
introduction from (Leigh, 1985) 
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Further, theory from literature regarding job-security can be summarized as follows; 
Employment protection can affect sickness rate in different ways. First is the behavior effect, 
where weaker job-security results in increasing risk of redundancies. The employees have an 
incentive for continue working instead of reporting sick and risk being laid off. This is quite 
similar to the incentive effect, while the behavior effect could mitigate or reinforce the 
incentive effect. Whether the behavior effect reinforce or mitigate, depends on the state of 
business cycle. Second, sickness rate can be affected by a compositional effect. Weaker 
employment protection can lead to more redundancies of sickness prone workers. Thereby 
mitigate average sickness at the workplace, Olsson (2009).  
Adding the aspect of job-security are of interest since it could provide a clearer explanation 
for the high level of sickness-absence      
   Previous findings from Johansson and Palme (2002) with Swedish data from 1990-1991, 
find that the increased cost of being absent caused the decreased absence rate, rather than a 
higher unemployment rate. More recently, similar result have been reported from Arai and 
Thoursie (2005)  and Askildsen et al. (2005) . Their results indicate that procyclical variations 
are a response of a behavior change from the stable workers. However, Nordberg and Røed 
(2009) results indicate that workers absence behavior is affected by the incentive effect and 
stress effect. Further, they find evidence of the selecting effect, that health status among 
workers are negatively related to the business cycle.  
  This paper complements existing literature and research by studying job-security and the 
procyclical effects with improved data. The improvements in the data are the knowledge of 
where the transition goes for individuals after ending a spell sequence. All individuals are 
observed at work the following month. Further, we have the inclusion of short time spells. 
Previous papers like Nordberg and Røed (2009) and Askildsen, Bratberg and Nilsen (2005) 
uses absence spells only exceeding two weeks. They are defined as long-term spells, and in 
the present dataset they only cover 42% of all absence spell. The last 58% are short-term 
spells. This analysis considers all spells from 1 to 365 days. The inclusion of short-term will 
yield more precise measurements and reflect the absent workers better.   
For analyzing, we make us of a parametric Weibull model. This model measures time to 
events, or in this case, from sickness to work. Previous papers used a non-parametric model 
that yields larger standard error, and therefore less precise estimates.  
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Since workers diseases are unknown2, we are conditioning the unemployment rate at the time 
of entry into an absence spell. This is for capturing unobserved cyclical heterogeneity among 
workers entering the spells, e.g. the selecting effect. Further, we use labor-market 
developments during absence spells for capturing the causal effects that could influence 
absence behavior of workers. This is further discussed in the section of identification strategy 
and estimation.  
  This analysis shows that sickness-absences in Troms county have a cyclical respondence to 
labor-markets changes. A tighter labor-market, equally to economic upturns yields longer 
absence-duration. Different causal effects created by changes in the labor-market are 
observed, and we find significant differences between the respected sectors.  
  The organization of the reminder is structured as follows. Section 2 presents some empirical 
literature. Section 3 describes the data used in this analysis. Section 4 presents the method, 
Section 5 presents the identification strategy and estimation process. Section 6 presents the 
results and interpretation, while section 7 concludes  
 
Empirical Literature  
Absenteeism alone have been investigated numerous times with the Neoclassical approach 
for explaining it. It bases on individuals labor-supply and firms labor-demand decisions when 
maximizing their utility. See Allen (1981), T. Barmby, Sessions, and Treble (1994) and (T. 
Barmby, Orme, & Treble, 1995; Coles & Treble, 1993) 
The first paper investigating the relationship unemployment rate and absenteeism was done 
by Leigh (1985). He used individual data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics together 
with industry unemployment rates and found support for incentive and selecting mechanisms 
in the United States. Ruhm (2003) used in his paper microdata rom the National Health 
Interview Surveys for the 1972-1981 period. Ruhms’ major findings are the existence of a 
counter-cyclical variation in physical health, and the most exposed are individuals in prime-
working age, employed persons and males. More recently, Arai and Thoursie (2005) tested 
the procyclical pattern in Sweden. They analyzed aggregate industry-region panel data from 
1989 to 1999 in which marginal workers were represented with temporary contracts and 
stabile workers with permanent contracts. When investigating the correlation between sick 
rates and the share of temporary contracts they found that temporary workers had lower sick-
                                                 
2. Due to time limitations the approval process for diagnosis was above 6 months. Since this is a master thesis 
we did not consider this option.  
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rates – that is, a negative correlation – implying that the incentive effect dominates. However, 
using temporary contracts as a proxy for the selecting effect have several shortcomings. First, 
they don’t differentiate on who enters a short-term contract. The heterogeneity is potentially 
huge. Second, “short-term” is not defined in terms of length, and people with poor health 
could easily push themselves through a month of work for the economic incentive3. 
Meanwhile, Askildsen et al. (2005) try to distinguish between the two channels in Norway. 
Using a panel of Norwegian register data on long-term sickness absences. Their results 
suggest that procyclical variations in sickness absence is caused by stable workers and not by 
marginal workers. In a related paper, Nordberg & Røed (2009) use a comprehensive 
multivariate mixed proportional hazard model to examine the transition from absence to work 
resumption and absence to rehabilitation. Their results suggest that both effects are present in 
their data. However, a limitation with both these studies is that they only observe absences 
longer than two weeks, therefore, do not consider short-term absences. Moreover, Nordberg 
& Røed (2009) do not report which effect that have the largest impact.   
Regarding job-security, in the Italian paper from Ichino and Riphahn (2005), they use weekly 
observations for 858 individuals in a Italian bank. The individuals are eligible for job-
protection after 12 weeks of work. They measure the probability of being absent and find that 
the probabilities increased substantively after 12 weeks. In the Swedish paper written by 
Olsson (2009) he investigated how decreased job-security impacted sickness absence. Olsson 
exploited the exemption in the Swedish Employment Act, that gave employers the possibility 
to exempt two workers from the seniority rule during layoffs. He finds that the exemption 
decreased sickness absence by more than 13%. He further state that this is due to an absence 
behavior effect, that is equal to causal effects.  
  This paper is closely related to Nordberg and Røed (2009) and makes an effort in 
complementing and help further research, by improved data, within this field of economics.  
A more detailed description follows the Data and Method section.  
 
 
                                                 
3 Olsson used the Swedish Employment Security Act from 2001 for demonstrating the impact job-security have 





We use data collected by the Norwegian Labor and Welfare Directorate (henceforth, Arbeids 
og Velferdsdirektoratet) which contains all absence spells in Troms county, lasting from 1 to 
365 days, between January 2010 and December 2017. The argument for restricting length of 
absences to 365 days is the financial arrangements. Norwegian workers who are eligible for 
sick-pay, have the right to 100% financial cover the first year of sickness absence. After one 
year of sick-pay, individuals are transferred to work assessment allowance that covers 66% of 
previous income. Hence, a potential financial motive is reduced after one year. The sample 
consist of 230428 recorded absence spells in and all spells required a medical certificate. 
Further, individuals have their unique ID number and are followed their whole sickness 
period before returning to work. This feature ensures that all individuals are observed in work 
the following month after ending a spell sequence. This feature is not present in the paper for 
Nordberg and Røed. Instead they infer that work resumption has occurred when sickness 
benefits are exhausted4.  Some of absence-spells starts before the last one ended. These 
overlapping absences are merged into one spell. Absence spells lasting longer than 365 days 
have been removed from the sample. This ensures that right-censoring is not present in the 
analysis.  
  The dependent variable is absence length where units are in days, stretching from 1 to 365 
days. The explanatory variables are used because they are believed to influence sickness 
absence. They can be divided into three types of explanatory variables, the demographic 
variables, the geographical variables and labor-market variables. The demographic variables 
are profession, sex, sector, age and level of sickness leave, also known as graded sick-leave. 
The main purpose is investigating how the labor-market conditions affect the sickness 
absence, However, the demographic factors are quite basic and few, and with 230428 events, 
overfitting is not an issue5. The geographical variable is the restriction to Troms county. The 
labor-market variables are the unemployment rate and two changes in unemployment rate 
variables, that are discussed later. The remainder of this section gives a deeper explanation 
regarding the explanatory variables. 
 
                                                 
4 Nordberg and Røed are aware of this feature. For further information, view footnote 5 at page 209. Nordberg, 
M. and K. Røed (2009). "Economic Incentives, Business Cycles, and Long‐Term Sickness Absence." Industrial 
Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society 48(2): 203-230. 
  
5 One “rule of thumb” for avoiding overfitting is a ratio of 1/10 with respect to covariate and events.   
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Demographic Variables  
Individuals in the data are from 20 to 59 years old. Rather than being a continuous variable, 
age is represented with eight dummy variables. Each dummy variable has a categorical 
interval of five years. There exists a rising absent-trend with respect to age for both sexes. 
Workers above 59 years old is therefore excluded from the sample. The argument is that 
older individuals are more exposed to sickness and could give biased results.  
There are nine different profession groups. Each profession is represented with their own 
dummy variable, see table 1 for more info. 
  Sex is presented as a dummy variable. Difference between the sexes are not of interest, 
since previous papers have shown that women are more absent than men. However, including 
the sex variable are important because it can explain much of the variation that are observed. 
  Graded sick-leave and full-time sick-leave is treated as two dummy variables. Graded sick-
leave is a tool for keeping workers connected to the workplace and ensure a smoother 
transition from being absent to be back at work. Its purpose is reducing individual’s sickness 
absence. The definition for Graded sick leave in this analysis is being part time sick between 
20% and 99% of your working capability. The specific limit of 20% are set since individuals 
under 20% are not eligible for sick payments. By including this variable in the analysis, we 
can control that these individuals have in fact decreased their sickness duration. No further 
emphasizing will be done with this factor. There exist three different sectors, they are labeled 
private-, municipality- and government sector. Each are represented with their own dummy 
variable.  
Geographical Variable and Restriction 
The geographical factor that restricts this analysis to Troms county are interesting for two 
reasons. First is the procyclical absenteeism that is observed. Troms county have a relative 
low unemployment rate and a high degree of sickness absence compared to other counties in 
Norway. According to NAV (20.12.2017) the registered sick leaves for the 3. quarter of 2017 
in Troms county was 6%. While the average for Norway the same period was 5.4%. In 
January 2018 Troms county had the lowest unemployment rate in Norway with 1.7%. The 
average unemployment rate at the same time for Norway was 2.6%, NAV (29.06.2018).  
Second is the high degree of public workplaces, that is government sector and private sector. 
The public sector in Troms county is relatively large compared to private sector. In this 
dataset public sickness absences represent 51% of all observed spells. Previous papers have 
stated that job-security impact absences. As mentioned, there exists two laws in Norway that 
govern the labor markets, that is, “Statsansatteloven” and the Working Environment Act, 
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where the former yields higher job-security. Since the government sector follows 
“Statsansatteloven”, where municipality together with private-sector follows “The Working 
Environment Act” we expect different absence behavior among the workers. View table 2 for 
a quick summary of absence duration for the three sectors. The table show that municipality 
have the longest median sickness length. While private sector has the longest average and the 
government sector has the shortest average. The reason for reporting the average and median 
is the skewed distribution of duration.  Numbers are in days. Hence, analyzing if job-security 
impacts the causal and selecting-effects, are of interest. 
As stated, male and female differences are not emphasized. However, notice that the majority 
in the samples are women. This majority of women could potentially influence the results in 
sectors where men are out-numbered. For further information, view table 2 at the end of the 
section.     
Labor-Market Variables 
The labor-market variables are represented in the analysis with the unemployment rate and 
two difference variables that are discussed later. We use the unique number of unemployed 
individuals in Troms county. For identifying the state of the business cycle the 
unemployment rate is used as a proxy.  A high business cycle state is associated with a tight-
labor market, since this yields less available jobs. Further, the level of unemployment and the 
change in unemployment is used for identifying unobserved health status among workers 
entering the spell, this is later discussed in the identification section. The unemployment rate 
is collected from SSB and are seasonal adjusted with the X-12 ARIMA method for avoiding 
the effect of seasonality. The period of observation is characterized by a down-trending 
unemployment rate, that is equal to a tighter labor market and a higher business cycle. By 
having one main trend in the level of unemployment could be a drawback. Individuals can 
adapt to higher demands, and more stressful times that follows a tighter labor-market. This 
could impact the causal effect and selecting effect, see Feil! Fant ikke referansekilden..  
 






Number of absences and their percentage 
 Number of observed 
absences 
 
Percentage of total data 
All absences 230428 100 
Men 90435 39.3 
Women  139993 60.7 
Age   
20-24 24530 10.6 
25-29 29352 12.7 
30-34 30072 13 
35-39 30692 13.3 
40-44 32981 14.3 
45-49 31038 13.4 
50-54 27165 11.8 
55-59 24598 10.7 
Professions   
Military  4346 30.3 
Administrative leaders and 
Politicians 
10715 1.8 
Academics  43403 4.6 
College professions 38887 18.8 
Office administration 13623 16.8 
Sales and Service 
proffesions 
70004 5.9 
Farmers and Fishermans  1640 0.7 
Craft Mans  18358 7.9 
Machine, transportation 
and Process  
14314 6.2 
Cleaner and assistants 15138 6.5 
Sectors   
Government 44442 19.3 
Municipality   73732 32.0 
Private 112254 48.7 
   
Graded sick leave 52505 22.7 









Table 2  
Characteristics of sectors 
 Number of absence spells Numbers in days  













Municipality 12572 61160 12 36.92 73732 
Private 65139 47115 11 37.10 112254 
      





The Choice of Statistical Method 
The argument for using “time to event” analysis relies on the data distribution and the ability 
of modeling worker-behavior as the macroeconomic environment changes. Since the data 
don’t contain any form of censoring, a standard regression procedure could be used. 
However, this may be an insufficient solution since (1) the sickness distribution is highly 
positive skewed with a long tail the right, se figure 2 in appendix; (2) the probability of 
surviving past a point in time is of more interest than the event itself; and (3) the hazard 
function in survival analysis can give more information of failures than normal regression. 
Further, we are interested in what affects the time until an event occurs. In this case, how 
labor-market conditions affect the length of absenteeism. Based on this, we turn to the branch 
of survival analysis.   
Surival Analysis  
Survival analysis is the study of time to event and the factors that influences them. Survival 
analysis is known as event history analysis in social science and reliability analysis in 
engineering. A survival endpoint can refer to both a positive and negative event. Examples of 
studies with survival outcomes are clinical trials, animal experiments and engineering 
reliance where they focus on time until death, progression, destruction or transition.    
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Parametric versus Non-Parametric 
At first, a semi-parametric cox proportional hazard model was created, similar to the 
multivariate mixed proportional hazard model Nordberg and Røed (2009) used. For testing 
the proportionality assumption, a Schoenfeld residual test was used. The low p-values 
indicated violation of the proportional hazard assumption for the covariates. Therefore, a 
parametric approach is preferred. According to Bradburn, Clark, Love, and Altman (2003) a 
parametric approaches is more efficient when used properly since they give smaller standard 
errors6. Further, the first objective is specifying a distribution that fits the variation in 
sickness duration. Several distributions were tested to see which gave the best fit. For 
comparing the distributions, the log likelihood and Akaike criterion was used. The result is 
reported in table 3.  
 
Table 3 Log-likelihood and AIC results 
Distributions 
 Exponential Weibull Gauss Logistic Extreme 
Log likelihood -1040258 -1008882 -1277451 -1220510 -1381274 




Using the highest log likelihood- and lowest AIC value, the Weibull distribution is selected 
for further computations. The last diagnostic check if survival times do follow a Weibull 
distribution, is known as log(-log(survival) plot. According to Moore (2016) this is 
mathematically defined as    = log [−log (  (  )] . Where    is plotted against log (  ), further, 
a straight line is fitted through the points. If the points fall along the straight line its’ 
concluded that survival times could be modeled using a Weibull distribution. The resulting 
plot is shown in figure 3 in appendix. Except from one outlier and a few converging dots, the 
survival time show a close agreement with a Weibull distribution. According to Moore 
(2016) An alternative to the proportional hazard model is the Weibull model that also have 
the features of an Accelerated failure time model.  Conclusion; the Weibull distribution was 
selected for further computations. 
                                                 
6The difference between non-parametric and parametric models is assuming that the hazard ratio follows a 
statistical distribution when a parametric proportional hazard model is fitted to the data, while the cox model 
does not follow this constraint. Except from this, the two methods are equal, with same interpretation of the 




The Weibull Model  
In survival analysis, the cumulative distribution function is given by                                             
 ( ) =   (  ≤  ), 0 <   < ∞, and is right continuous. Further, the probability density 
function is  ( ) = −
  
  
 ( ) or  ( ) =
 
  
 ( ) and is the rate of change of CDF. The hazard 
function relates to the survival function and PDF by the formula ℎ( ) =
 ( )
 ( )
, and  Moore 
(2016) defines a survival distribution mathematically as;  
  ( ) =  ( ) ∗ ℎ( )   (1) 
Where the S(t) is the survival function and h(t) is the hazard function. The Weibull 
distribution have Survival function  ( ) =     
 
 and Hazard function ℎ( ) =       , with 
the parameters shape (α) and scale (λ). The relationship between S(t) and h(t) is clearly 
defined by the calculus formula ℎ( ) =
  
  
[log  ( )] . If either S(t) or h(t) is known, the other 
is automatically determined, see  Clark et al. (2003) . Therefore, with this is mind, the hazard 
rate is specified as  
 
ℎ( ,  ) = lim
  → 




   (2) 
Where t is spell duration, T is time of events, z is a vector of covariates. According to this 
formula, the hazard depends now on observed time-varying and time-invariant 
characteristics.  
In the vector z, some of the included covariates are age, profession, county and sex. The 
labor-market conditions are present by the unemployment rate.   
   According to Bradburn et al. (2003) when survival times follows a Weibull distribution it 
can be shown that an accelerated failure time model can be used for modeling survival times. 
According to Carroll (2003) Accelerated Failure-Time models examine survival time through 
a log-linear model. This ensures that the treatment effects are expressed in terms of a relative 
increase or decrease in survival time. For simplicity, the distribution of time to event of, T, as 
a function of a single covariate is given by 
                                                 log( ) =     +     +     
 





That is the basic structure of a Weibull regression model, where σ is shape, and ϵ have an 
extreme value distribution. This is also known as an Accelerated Failure Time model, since 
the covariates effect on time scale is multiplicative, they therefore accelerate survival times 
Moore (2016). One property of the AFT model, if the covariate is effective, the AFT 
coefficient will be positive. This means that the covariate gives longer survival time. If the 
covariate is not effective it decreases survival time and the AFT coefficient will be negative. 
In terms of measuring absence duration, our view of the coefficient will be of the opposite 
site. A negative coefficient yields shorter absence spell and therefore decreases absence 
duration. That is a sign of improved health among workers. For measuring the magnitude of 
accelerated failure time constants, they need to be transformed to acceleration factors. This is 
done by taking the exponential of each covariate.  That is    , where β represents the 
coefficient. This acceleration factors are either larger or smaller than 1. A factor larger than 
one increases failure time, and a factor less than one decreases failure time. Or similar, a 
factor larger than one increases absence duration where a factor smaller than 1 decreases 
absence duration. For viewing the magnitude in days, these acceleration factors need to be 
multiplied with either the median or mean survival time of the sample.      
 
Identification Strategy and Estimation  
A problematic aspect in survival analysis is the presence of unobserved heterogeneity among 
individuals. The same applies in this analysis, especially since information regarding 
diagnoses are unknown7. Shorter absences are associated with less serious diseases and 
longer absences with more serious diseases, for more information view Sundell (2018).  
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the unemployment affect sickness-absence 
duration. To do this we need to separate the potential causal effect from the observationally 
similar selecting effect.  
  As stated, the selecting effect arises if employment behavior of people with poor health is 
especially cyclical. In this thesis, I choose the same strategy as Nordberg and Røed 
(2009).That is, separating the causal effects by conditioning on labor market conditions at the 
time workers enters a sickness spell. We therefore condition on two labor market variables, 
the level of unemployment and the change in unemployment at the time of entry into sickness 
                                                 
7 Due to long processing time, diagnosis was not considered for this master thesis 
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absence. Like in Nordberg and Røed (2009) the coefficients of these two variables are thus 
meant to measure the cyclical variation in unobserved health condition among those who 
enter sickness absence. That is, capturing the seriousness of diseases among workers who 
enters a spell sequence. Further, I call these two variables as entry variables. Labor-market 
developments during the absence spell are included to capture the causal effects.  
  The causal effects are difficult to measure. The optimal solution would be having a more 
direct proxy when measuring. For instance, how much money have been invested in health 
promoting activities the least years. If the incentive-, stress- and monitoring effects are not 
strongly present, it could be a response of mitigation from each-other. However, due to lack 
of data we must rely on the assumption that the change in unemployment during absence 
used as a proxy for causalities and cyclical health is a good enough indicator. 
  As mentioned, different job-security laws towards the labor-market could influence 
sickness-absence. This was the argument for investigating the sectors. 
In Norway, it is well known that different sectors have different magnitudes of sickness 
duration. We are therefore interested in investigating if there exist different absence behavior 
among workers, and employment behavior of people with poor health within the different 
sectors.  
For investigating how the state of business cycle affect the sickness-absence duration within 
different sectors, we make interaction terms with the dummy variables and labor-market 
variables. Each sector is represented with its own dummy variable and then interacted with 
the labor-market variables. This approach allows workers within the sectors to react 
differently with the changes in the labor-market.  
The coefficients show how the sectors respond to changes in the labor-market.  
Since the government sector follows «Statsansatteloven» that provides stronger job-security 
we expect longer absences for this sector. That is, the incentive effect is mitigated since 
workers are less afraid of losing their jobs. Further, municipality sector and government 
sector consist of non-profit organizations. For instance, hospitals, nursing homes, police 
department and the State Highways Authority. These jobs are, in theory, risk free for 
bankruptcy. Workers are therefore less afraid that their absence could interrupt the survival of 
the workplace. This could mitigate the incentive effect for going back to work.  Private sector 
consists of profit organizations and have weaker job-security, we therefore expect the 
incentive effect to be dominating in this sector.  
  As previously mentioned, this sample contains both short-term and long-term spells. 
Previous papers from Norway did not have this opportunity. Papers as Nordberg and Røed 
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(2009) and Askildsen et al. (2005) uses spells lasting from 14 to 365 days. Only viewing 
long-term absences may be a drawback, and both papers argues that short-term spells may be 
more financially motivated. However, short-term absences may also be viewed as more 
acceptable among employers when workers consider a sickness absence8.  Previous papers 
only using long-term absences thus faced a more biased result regarding heterogeneity. 
Individuals that have a less serious disease tends to return early to work, leaving behind 
individuals with more serious diseases. By including the short-term absence spell, we get a 
more complete picture of absence duration.  
  From 2010 to 2017 there were no institutional changes in the sickness insurance system that 
could biased the results. The Working Environment Act govern the Norwegian labor market 
for private and the municipality sector. Its purpose is securing a work environment that gives 
a healthy and meaningful working situation, see chapter 1, (sosialdepartementet, LOV-2005-
06-17-62). This act was realized in 2005 and have been updated several times. There have 
been no major changes in the act that could potential affect the causal effects. However, year 
2001 was the beginning for “IA-avtalen”, that is “Inkluderende Arbeidsliv Avtalen” or 
“Including Working Agreement”  Regjering (25.01.2017). The agreement was updated 
4.march 2014 and aims at increasing follow-up actions of sick individuals and increasing 
their activity level, one tool is the usage of graded sick leave, (Regjering, 25.01.2017).  This 
could potentially affect the causal effects for sickness absence behavior. Graded sick-leave 
have a rising trend in the data, this could potentially interrupt the results. 
  The estimation is completed in two steps. First, we do a regression model with no 
interaction terms. This is a simple model where we investigate how the business cycle 
conditions impact the general sickness-absence. Next step is creating a more realistic model 
with interaction terms between the labor-market variables and the respected sectors. This 
approach allows workers absence-duration within the sectors to react differently with the 
changes in the labor-market. 




                                                 
8 An analysis of sickness absence across income quantiles from Germany show that rich people constantly take a 




Before proceeding to the results, we do a quick brief for how to interpret and expect the 
results. Be aware that one unit increase in the labor-market variables is equal to a worsening 
business cycle. 
Regarding the causal effect (Leigh, 1985), we look at the coefficients from the change in 
unemployment during absence spells. Recall that the stress effect Ruhm (2003) would lead to 
shorter absence spell when unemployment rises. The argument is that lower economic 
activity during absence spells results in less stressed workers. The presence of an incentive 
effect would also yield shorter absence. The increase in unemployment during absence would 
shorten the spell. The argument relies on the foundation of absence theory. If lower economic 
activity increases the probability of being laid-off, then you have an incentive for going back 
to work. Since you fear the risk of being laid-off. Lower economic activity during absence 
should therefore decrease the spell.  
According to theory stated in the introduction, monitoring effect (Audas & Goddard, 
2001)with other health promoting activities, increases during good times for avoiding 
absence. In contrast, during bad times monitoring are decreasing, one argument is that 
employers will avoid the increased costs from monitoring during bad times. We therefore 
expect the monitoring effect to be less dominating in this situation.  
  The selection effect is measured with the two entry variables. The coefficients for the two 
entry variables gives indications for the cyclical variation in unobserved health among 
entrants. From theory, we expect the threshold for claiming sick during bad times to increase. 
That is, we expect the coefficient for the change in unemployment before entry to sick-leave 
to be positive, this indicates that more serious diseases enter the spells.  
One unit increase in the level of unemployment rate is equal to a bad, but stable, business 
cycle condition. We therefore expect the coefficient to be negative. Meaning that average 
health among workers are inversely related to the level of unemployment rate.  
With respect to workers within different sectors we expect different absence behavior. The 
argument is that higher job-security could reveal a lower incentive effect for going back to 
work when sick.  






Table 4 Regression Results 
Variables 
 





Reference group age (40-44 years)   
20-24 -0.261***                                       
(0.011) 
-0.260***                                                    
(0.011) 
25-2 9 -0.107***                                      
(0.010) 
-0.107***                                                   
(0.010) 
30-34 -0.061***                                     
(0.010) 
-0.060***                                                  
(0.010) 
35-39 -0.048***                                     
(0.010) 
-0.047***                                                   
(0.010) 
45-49 0.071***                                       
(0.010) 
0.071***                                                     
(0.010) 
50-54 0.128***                                       
(0.010) 
0.128***                                                     
(0.010) 
55-59 0.227***                                        
(0.011) 
0.226***                                                     
(0.011) 
Part time sick leave  1.548*** 
(0.006) 
 1.548***                                                 
(0.006) 
Reference group(Private)    
Government -0.214***                                      
(0.008) 
0.129                                                      
(0.097) 
Municipality -0.128***                                     
(0.007) 
0.118                                                     
(0.084) 
Reference group (Private)    
Change in unemployment rate during absence -0.081***                                       
(0.001) 
-0.087***                                                 
(0.001) 
Government*Change in unemployment during absence   0.011***                                                    
(0.002) 
Municipality*Change in unemployment during absence  0.013***                                                    
(0.002) 
Change in unemployment rate before entry 0.058***                                       
(0.001) 
0.061***                                                    
(0.002) 
Government*Change in unemployment before entry  -0.009***                                                  
(0.004) 
Municipality*Change in unemployment before entry  -0.006**                                                     
(0.003) 
The level of unemployment rate -0.414***                                     
(0.027) 
-0.348***                                                  
(0.032) 
Municipality*The level of unemployment rate  -0.110***                                                  
(0.038) 
Government*The level of unemployment rate   -0.155***                                                   
(0.044) 
Constant 150.209***                                    
(4.039) 
149.836***                                                  
(4.041) 
Observations 230,428 230,428 
Log likelihood -976,334.700 -976,301.700 
Chi2  84,686.030*** (df=24) 84,751.940*** (df=30) 
Note:            *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Standard errors in parentheses. Both models include group fixed effects 
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The setup of this table is for making it simpler to differentiate between the entry variables and 
labor-market developments during absence in the more realistic model. 
  Recall that the coefficients are accelerated failure time constant, AFT. A negative AFT 
coefficient indicates a higher hazard rate, this decreases the length of survival, that is 
equivalent to decreasing the absence-spell. The standard errors are extremely low. This show 
that we are not worried for statistical uncertainty.   
  We start out by viewing the simple model where we look at how the labor-market variables 
affect sickness absence.  
We begin by viewing how the causal effects unfold during sickness absence.  
The change in unemployment during absence is negative (-0.081) and highly significant. This 
indicates that lower economic activity during absence spells tend to shorten the spells. By 
theory this indicates that the incentive effect dominates. That is, lower economic activity 
during absence spells gives the worker an incentive for going back to work. The worker is 
controlled by the fear of losing the job.  
  Now looking at the entry variables for capturing the selection effect.  First variable is the 
change in unemployment at entry, the coefficient is positive (0.058) and significant. This 
indicates that when unemployment increases, less healthy workers enter sickness absence. 
Further, we interpret this as when the economic activity decreases, workers increase their 
“threshold” for claiming sick, resulting in less healthy entrants.  
Second, we have the level of unemployment at entry. This coefficient is negative (-0.414) and 
significant and by far the greatest in magnitude among the labor-market variables. This 
negative coefficient indicates that the unemployment decreases absence spells. Indicating that 
the average health status among entrants improves when the business cycle decreases.  This 
suggest that the selection effect dominates.    
  When we look at the indicator variables for the different sectors, we see that the coefficient 
for government sector is negative (-0.214) and significant. For municipality sector the 
coefficient is negative (-0.128) and significant. indicating that workers in the government- 
and municipality sector has shorter absence spells, and that the average health improves more 
compared to workers in the private sector. These sectors are significantly different from the 
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private sector9.  
 
Now moving over to the more realistic model where we allow workers within different 
sectors to interact with changes in the labor-market. We begin with the indicator variables for 
the sectors. The coefficient for government is positive (0.129), and for municipality it is 
positive (0.118.), However, they are no longer significant. We interpret this that the absence 
behavior between sectors is differing because sick absent workers react differently on labor-
market conditions.  
   Further, we look at the coefficient for the interaction terms. beginning with change in 
unemployment during absence for viewing how the causality effects unfold. As expected, the 
coefficient for private workers, that is the reference group, is negative (-0.87) and significant. 
This coefficient decreases the absence spell, indicating that the incentive effect dominates. 
Further, we look at the interaction term during absence for government workers. The 
coefficient is positive (0.011) and significant. This variable shortens the absence spell, but by 
a less amount compared to private workers.  We see the same applies for the Municipality 
variable. The coefficient is positive (0.013) and significant. indicating that this variable 
shortens the absence spell but by a less degree compared to the reference group.  This 
indicates that the incentive effect is less dominating for government- and municipality 
workers compared to private workers. This suggest that the behavior effect from job-security 
mitigate the incentive effect for Municipality and Government workers. Lower economic 
activity during absence spell tends to shorten the spell. Indicating that the workers are afraid 
of losing their job, however, the results also indicates that municipality- and government 
workers don’t share the same fear of losing their job, and results in longer sickness-absence 
   Lets’ look at the entry variables that capture unobserved cyclical variation among entering 
workers. We begin with the private variable that are the reference group. The coefficient for 
change in unemployment is as expected, positive (0.061) and significant. This coefficient 
indicates that the variable increases the spell and that unobserved cyclical variation has 
worsened.  By word, lower economic activity before entering a spell tend to lengthen the 
spell, yielding less healthy workers entering into sickness-absence. This indicates that the 
threshold for claiming sick have increased, since a worse health condition is justified for 
                                                 
9 A new regression was conducted with municipality sector as reference group. This was for investigating if 
there was significant differences between municipality and government sector. The result showed that they were 
statistically different from each other, for more info view table 8.  
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being absent when labor-market worsens.  
Moving on to the coefficient for the interaction term between government and change in 
unemployment rate before entry. This coefficient is negative (-0.009). This increases the 
absence spell but by a less amount compared to the private variable. We see similar results 
for the municipality variables with a negative coefficient of (-0.006). It indicates that 
unobserved cyclical variation among government and municipality entrants have worsened, 
but less worsened compared to private workers. That is, lower economic activity before 
entering decreases the spell, less healthy individuals are entering.  When comparing the 
coefficients, this indicates that the “threshold” for claiming sick is lower for government and 
municipality workers compared to private workers.  
  Finally, we investigate how the level of unemployment interacts with the workers in 
different sectors. We start with private workers that is the reference group. This coefficient is 
negative (-0.348) and significant. Indicating that the average health status among entrants 
improves during higher levels of the unemployment rate. Next is the interaction with the 
government variable, this coefficient is negative (-0.155) and significant. This increases 
absence duration and by a greater amount compared to private workers. Viewing at the 
municipality interaction we see similar results. The coefficient is negative (-0.110) and 
significant. This coefficient indicates that absence duration for municipality workers 
increases by a greater amount than private workers. We interpret the results that average 
health status among workers entering the spell improves during higher levels of 
unemployment. The selection effect is therefore dominating. Further, these results indicate 
that average health condition among municipality workers and government workers 
fluctuates more with changes in labor-market tightness compared to private workers. This 
suggest that the compositional effect from job-security dominates. Weaker employment 
protection leads to more redundancies of sickness prone workers. This leaves behind more 
healthy workers with an average health that fluctuate less with the state of business cycle.  
At last we change the reference groups in the more realistic model, the coefficients indicate 
that there are statistical differences between private and municipality workers and between 
private and government workers, but not significance differences between government and 
municipality workers.  
  Interestingly, according to the results, men are not statistically different from women with 
the positive coefficient (0.007). Further, the coefficient for age are as expected. When 




The coefficient for part time sick leave is positive (1.548) and significant. This indicates that 
individuals that are part time sick have longer absence spells than those who are full time 
sick. The part time sick leave has no decreasing effect of absence spells. This could be a 
paradox since graded sick leave as a tool was expected to decrease the absence spell.     
Remember the formula for finding the acceleration factor.  That is    , where    represents 
some accelerated failure time coefficient. For finding how one unit increase in unemployment 
rate affect the sickness absence in days, we do the following.    .    *median of the 
respected variable. The results are in table 5. 
 






   ∗            ∗         
Private  11 37.10 -0.348 0.7060 7.7 26.19 
Municipality 12 36.92 -0.458 0.6325 7.5 23.35 
Government 11 33.52 -0.503 0.6047 6.6 20.26 
 
From the table we see that one percent increase in the unemployment rate decreases the 
absence spells. For the private sector it decreases the median by 3.3 days. For municipality 
sector it decreases by 4.5 days, and for government sector it decreases the median with 4.4 
days.   
 
Concluding Remarks  
In this thesis we have investigated the relationship between the unemployment and sickness 
absence in Troms county. The observation period lasted from 2010 to 2017 where we 
observed 230428 transitions from sickness-absence back to work. We have set up a Weibull 
survival model that investigates the causal relationship between labor market tightness and 
workers absence behavior and the cyclical selecting of employees with bad health during 
different states of the business cycle. Our key findings are from the more realistic model and 
are as follows:  
The sickness-absence in Troms are to a high degree procyclical. The unemployment has a 
causal impact on workers sickness-behavior. Lower economic activity during absence spells, 
tend to shorten the spell. This result indicates the workers absence behavior are driven by the 
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incentive effect. Workers have an incentive for going back to work in fear of losing the job. 
However, this fear is less shared by workers from the municipality- and government sector. 
Their behavior results in longer absences in their respected sector compared to private sector.  
  Unobserved cyclical variation entering an absence-spell, tend to worsen during lower 
economic activity before entering. Less healthy individuals enters the spell during lower 
economic activity.  This indicate that “threshold” for claiming sick have increased. However, 
the “threshold” for claiming sick are significantly lower in the municipality and government 
sector.   
  At last the level of unemployment. This variable decreases the absence spell, indicating that 
during higher levels of unemployment, that is equally to economic downturns, improves the 
average health status among entering workers. The Selecting effect dominates and pushes less 
healthy individuals out of the labor-market. Further, we see that average health status among 
municipality and government workers fluctuates more with business cycle conditions 
compared to private workers. The compositional effect is dominating, indicating that sickness 
prone workers have been laid-off in the private sector. Leaving behind workers with an 
average health status that are less affected by business cycle fluctuations. These results 
support the findings from Nordberg and Røed (2009) with respect to cyclical employment 
behavior and causal effects. However, by adding the aspect of job-security we find significant 
differences between the sectors.  
  By combining the above findings, the results suggest that the high share of government and 
municipality workplaces can to some degree explain why sickness-absence is substantial in 
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The following section contains lift and figures used during the analysis. For making it easier 
to read the thesis, all  
 












































KjonnMenn Male  
Yrke 0 Military 
Yrke 1 Administrative leaders and Politicians 
Yrke 2 Academics 
Ykre 3 College professions 
Yrke 4 Office administration 
Yrke 5 Sales and Service proffesions 
Yrke 6 Farmers and Fishermans 
Yrke 7 Craft Mans 
Yrke 8 Machine, transportation and Process 
Yrke 9 Cleaner and assistants 
Sektor_1 Government sector 
Sektor_2 Municipality sector 
Sektor_4 Private sector 
Aldergr1 Age 20-24 
Aldergr2 Age 25-29 
Aldergr3 Age 30-34 
Aldergr4 Age 35-39 
Aldergr5 Age 40-44 
Aldergr6 Age 45-49 
Aldergr7  Age 50-54 
Aldergr8 Age 55-59 
Ledighetsnivå.x Unemployment rate 
Månedlig_chg_ledige Unemployment rate at Entry 
Spell_chg Unemployment rate during absence 








Table 7 Regression of simple model 
Model without interaction  
                        Value Std. Error      z       p 
(Intercept)          1.49e+02   4.04e+00  36.81 < 2e-16 
year                -7.20e-02   1.98e-03 -36.30 < 2e-16 
kjonnMenn            6.63e-03   6.32e-03   1.05    0.29 
yrke0               -9.10e-02   2.03e-02  -4.48 7.3e-06 
yrke1                3.72e-03   1.33e-02   0.28    0.78 
yrke2               -8.90e-02   8.35e-03 -10.66 < 2e-16 
yrke3               -7.00e-02   8.21e-03  -8.53 < 2e-16 
yrke4               -1.43e-01   1.20e-02 -11.95 < 2e-16 
yrke6                1.79e-01   3.14e-02   5.71 1.1e-08 
yrke7               -1.12e-02   1.14e-02  -0.98    0.33 
yrke8                2.16e-01   1.24e-02  17.41 < 2e-16 
yrke9                9.45e-02   1.13e-02   8.35 < 2e-16 
aldergr1            -2.61e-01   1.08e-02 -24.06 < 2e-16 
aldergr2            -1.07e-01   1.01e-02 -10.64 < 2e-16 
aldergr3            -6.05e-02   9.96e-03  -6.08 1.2e-09 
aldergr4            -4.77e-02   9.88e-03  -4.83 1.4e-06 
aldergr6             7.07e-02   9.85e-03   7.18 7.0e-13 
aldergr7             1.28e-01   1.02e-02  12.52 < 2e-16 
aldergr8             2.27e-01   1.05e-02  21.58 < 2e-16 
sektor_kode1        -2.14e-01   8.23e-03 -26.03 < 2e-16 
sektor_kode2        -1.28e-01   6.92e-03 -18.52 < 2e-16 
gradertgradert       1.55e+00   6.37e-03 243.09 < 2e-16 
ledighetsnivå.x     -4.14e-01   2.71e-02 -15.27 < 2e-16 
månedlig_chg_ledige  5.75e-02   1.33e-03  43.14 < 2e-16 
spell_chg           -8.14e-02   8.35e-04 -97.49 < 2e-16 

















Table 8 Regression more realistic model 
                                     Value Std. Error      z       p 
(Intercept)                      148.28826    4.04095  36.70 < 2e-16 
year                              -0.07184    0.00198 -36.23 < 2e-16 
kjonnMenn                          0.00681    0.00633   1.08 0.28147 
yrke0                             -0.08852    0.02031  -4.36 1.3e-05 
yrke1                              0.00297    0.01332   0.22 0.82333 
yrke2                             -0.09002    0.00836 -10.76 < 2e-16 
yrke3                             -0.06931    0.00822  -8.43 < 2e-16 
yrke4                             -0.14317    0.01200 -11.93 < 2e-16 
yrke6                              0.17874    0.03140   5.69 1.3e-08 
yrke7                             -0.01162    0.01145  -1.01 0.31016 
yrke8                              0.21536    0.01242  17.34 < 2e-16 
yrke9                              0.09407    0.01130   8.32 < 2e-16 
aldergr1                          -0.26005    0.01083 -24.00 < 2e-16 
aldergr2                          -0.10744    0.01010 -10.64 < 2e-16 
aldergr3                          -0.06032    0.00996  -6.06 1.4e-09 
aldergr4                          -0.04748    0.00988  -4.81 1.5e-06 
aldergr6                           0.07075    0.00985   7.18 6.8e-13 
aldergr7                           0.12752    0.01021  12.49 < 2e-16 
aldergr8                           0.22629    0.01051  21.54 < 2e-16 
sektor_kode1                       0.12877    0.09745   1.32 0.18637 
sektor_kode2                       0.11839    0.08425   1.41 0.15996 
ledighetsnivå.x                   -0.34817    0.03220 -10.81 < 2e-16 
månedlig_chg_ledige                0.06117    0.00191  32.08 < 2e-16 
spell_chg                         -0.08732    0.00114 -76.41 < 2e-16 
gradertgradert                     1.54809    0.00637 243.12 < 2e-16 
sektor_kode1:ledighetsnivå.x      -0.15450    0.04377  -3.53 0.00042 
sektor_kode2:ledighetsnivå.x      -0.10988    0.03783  -2.90 0.00367 
sektor_kode1:månedlig_chg_ledige  -0.00947    0.00358  -2.65 0.00816 
sektor_kode2:månedlig_chg_ledige  -0.00646    0.00302  -2.14 0.03245 
sektor_kode1:spell_chg             0.01093    0.00223   4.90 9.4e-07 
sektor_kode2:spell_chg             0.01301    0.00184   7.07 1.6e-12 
















Table 9 Checking significance between sectors 
                       Value Std. Error      z       p 
(Intercept)          1.49e+02   4.04e+00  36.77 < 2e-16 
year                -7.20e-02   1.98e-03 -36.30 < 2e-16 
kjonnMenn            6.63e-03   6.32e-03   1.05    0.29 
yrke0               -9.10e-02   2.03e-02  -4.48 7.3e-06 
yrke1                3.72e-03   1.33e-02   0.28    0.78 
yrke2               -8.90e-02   8.35e-03 -10.66 < 2e-16 
yrke3               -7.00e-02   8.21e-03  -8.53 < 2e-16 
yrke4               -1.43e-01   1.20e-02 -11.95 < 2e-16 
yrke6                1.79e-01   3.14e-02   5.71 1.1e-08 
yrke7               -1.12e-02   1.14e-02  -0.98    0.33 
yrke8                2.16e-01   1.24e-02  17.41 < 2e-16 
yrke9                9.45e-02   1.13e-02   8.35 < 2e-16 
aldergr1            -2.61e-01   1.08e-02 -24.06 < 2e-16 
aldergr2            -1.07e-01   1.01e-02 -10.64 < 2e-16 
aldergr3            -6.05e-02   9.96e-03  -6.08 1.2e-09 
aldergr4            -4.77e-02   9.88e-03  -4.83 1.4e-06 
aldergr6             7.07e-02   9.85e-03   7.18 7.0e-13 
aldergr7             1.28e-01   1.02e-02  12.52 < 2e-16 
aldergr8             2.27e-01   1.05e-02  21.58 < 2e-16 
sektor_kode4         1.28e-01   6.92e-03  18.52 < 2e-16 
sektor_kode1        -8.60e-02   7.94e-03 -10.83 < 2e-16 
gradertgradert       1.55e+00   6.37e-03 243.09 < 2e-16 
ledighetsnivå.x     -4.14e-01   2.71e-02 -15.27 < 2e-16 
månedlig_chg_ledige  5.75e-02   1.33e-03  43.14 < 2e-16 
spell_chg           -8.14e-02   8.35e-04 -97.49 < 2e-16 



















Table 10 Testing significance between sectors in the realistic model 
                                    Value Std. Error      z       p 
(Intercept)                      148.40665    4.03955  36.74 < 2e-16 
year                              -0.07184    0.00198 -36.23 < 2e-16 
kjonnMenn                          0.00681    0.00633   1.08  0.2815 
yrke0                             -0.08852    0.02031  -4.36 1.3e-05 
yrke1                              0.00297    0.01332   0.22  0.8233 
yrke2                             -0.09002    0.00836 -10.76 < 2e-16 
yrke3                             -0.06931    0.00822  -8.43 < 2e-16 
yrke4                             -0.14317    0.01200 -11.93 < 2e-16 
yrke6                              0.17874    0.03140   5.69 1.3e-08 
yrke7                             -0.01162    0.01145  -1.01  0.3102 
yrke8                              0.21536    0.01242  17.34 < 2e-16 
yrke9                              0.09407    0.01130   8.32 < 2e-16 
aldergr1                          -0.26005    0.01083 -24.00 < 2e-16 
aldergr2                          -0.10744    0.01010 -10.64 < 2e-16 
aldergr3                          -0.06032    0.00996  -6.06 1.4e-09 
aldergr4                          -0.04748    0.00988  -4.81 1.5e-06 
aldergr6                           0.07075    0.00985   7.18 6.8e-13 
aldergr7                           0.12752    0.01021  12.49 < 2e-16 
aldergr8                           0.22629    0.01051  21.54 < 2e-16 
sektor_kode4                      -0.11839    0.08425  -1.41  0.1600 
sektor_kode1                       0.01038    0.10447   0.10  0.9208 
ledighetsnivå.x                   -0.45804    0.03633 -12.61 < 2e-16 
månedlig_chg_ledige                0.05471    0.00235  23.29 < 2e-16 
spell_chg                         -0.07430    0.00147 -50.38 < 2e-16 
gradertgradert                     1.54809    0.00637 243.12 < 2e-16 
sektor_kode4:ledighetsnivå.x       0.10988    0.03783   2.90  0.0037 
sektor_kode1:ledighetsnivå.x      -0.04462    0.04694  -0.95  0.3417 
sektor_kode4:månedlig_chg_ledige   0.00646    0.00302   2.14  0.0324 
sektor_kode1:månedlig_chg_ledige  -0.00301    0.00383  -0.79  0.4322 
sektor_kode4:spell_chg            -0.01301    0.00184  -7.07 1.6e-12 
sektor_kode1:spell_chg            -0.00208    0.00242  -0.86  0.3894 

















The most important r-studio codes 
 
Some of the most important codes used in r-studio are listed here.  
 
##Modelerring uten interaksjoner  
fit1 <-  survreg(Surv(lengde) ~ year + kjonn + yrke + aldergr + sektor_kode + gradert + 
ledighetsnivå.x + månedlig_chg_ledige + spell_chg, data = navdata, dist = "weibull") 
summary(fit1) 
 
###Changing reference group for checking significance 
table(navdata$sektor_kode) 
navdata$sektor_kode <- relevel(navdata$sektor_kode, ref = "2") 
 
##Still no interaksjoner 
fit1 <-  survreg(Surv(lengde) ~ year + kjonn + yrke + aldergr + sektor_kode + gradert + 
ledighetsnivå.x + månedlig_chg_ledige + spell_chg, data = navdata, dist = "weibull") 
summary(fit1) 
##Significantly different  
 
##Modelleringer  med interaksjoner 
fit2 <- survreg(Surv(lengde) ~ year + kjonn + yrke + aldergr + sektor_kode*ledighetsnivå.x + 
sektor_kode*månedlig_chg_ledige + sektor_kode*spell_chg + gradert, data = navdata, dist = 
"weibull") 
Summary(fit2) 
##Changing reference group for checking significance 
table(navdata$sektor_kode) 
navdata$sektor_kode <- relevel(navdata$sektor_kode, ref = "2") 
 
fit2 <- survreg(Surv(lengde) ~ year + kjonn + yrke + aldergr + sektor_kode*ledighetsnivå.x + 




##Still significantly different from privat, men government og municipality are not different 
##from each other in their interactions variables. They have equal behavior  
